Abstract-In this paper, we present FLiER, or Fingerprint Linear Estimation Routine for Line Failures. FLiER is an efficient algorithm to identify single-line topology errors in power networks using readings from sparselydeployed phasor measurement units (PMUs). When a power line is removed from a network, the event leaves a unique "voltage fingerprint" of bus voltage changes that we can identify using only the portion of the network directly observed by the PMUs. The naive brute-force algorithm to identify a failed line from such voltage fingerprints, though simple and accurate, is slow. We derive an approximate algorithm based on a local linearization that is faster and only slightly less accurate. We also extend this technique to the identification of multiple simultaneous line failures using linear programming. We present experimental results using the IEEE 57-bus and 118-bus networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Topology error correction is an important component of a network monitoring and control system. Standard state estimation techniques assume that the computed topology is correct [1] , and incorrect network topologies can result in poor and even dangerous control actions [2] , [3] . In addition, topology changes due to failed lines put stress on the remaining lines and may destabilize the network. Thus, it is important to identify failed lines quickly in order to take appropriate control actions.
Currently, it is difficult to find failed lines in distribution networks. Often, utilities lack the monitoring equipment to directly detect line failures, and are unaware of issues until customers call to report power losses. The radial nature of many distribution networks makes the task somewhat easier, but distributed generation will eliminate much of this benefit. Consequently, distribution network state estimation techniques such as [4] , [5] , [6] are particularly vulnerable to topology changes, as less information is available to correct for them. Algorithms for failed line identification allow utilities to quickly detect such problems, and allow for accurate state estimation even when the topology changes.
Finding line failures is usually simple in transmission networks, as transmission lines have sensors that directly report failures (or switch open/closed status). However, if a sensor malfunctions, or is compromised by a cyberintrusion, then finding the failed line is again difficult. Although failure to correctly identify a failed line is less common in a transmission network, the stakes are higher: state estimation based on incorrect topology assumptions can lead to incorrect estimates, causing operators to overlook system instability, and in the worst case, leading to avoidable blackouts. Thus, it is important to have more than one way to monitor network topology.
Most previous work on topology estimation explicitly models the circuit breakers at buses suspected of status errors [7] . Several papers solve a constrained optimization problem and use Lagrange multiplier values to detect errors [8] , [9] . Others use an MW-only model of the power network, exploiting the computational advantages of the linear approximation [3] , [10] , [11] . Still other authors simultaneously estimate state and topology [12] , [13] , [10] . Other approaches include using genetic algorithms to find the correct topology [14] and using auto-associative neural networks that "resonate" in response to the correct topology [15] .
In this paper, we introduce topology estimation techniques that use data collected from phasor measurement units (PMUs). PMUs are a new type of sensor that can directly measure voltage and current phasors at a bus dozens of times per second. Given knowledge of a bus's voltage phasor, the current phasors of the incoming lines, and the network's admittance properties, one can compute the voltage phasors of neighboring buses as well [16] . While most PMUs today are in the transmission grids, distribution grids are likely to see PMUs in the future as well [17] , [18] .
We present here an efficient method to identify failed power lines in networks with a (possibly small) number of PMUs. We assume that a complete state estimate is obtained shortly before a line fails, e.g. through conventional SCADA measurements, and we use discrepancies between this state estimate and PMU measurements to identify failures. Our method does not require complete observability from PMU data; it performs well even when there are few PMUs in the network, though having more PMUs does improve the accuracy.
Though this paper presents the algorithm in terms of identifying failed lines, it equally applies to the case of identifying a newly-connected line in the network. In fact, one could envision a range of possible FLiER variants, each designed to address a different type of change in the network's admittance matrix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND FINGERPRINTS
Let y ik = g ik + b ik denote the elements of the network admittance matrix Y ∈ C n×n . Furthermore, let P and Q denote the real and reactive power injections at a bus in the network, and let v = |v | exp(θ ) denote the voltage phasor at bus . These quantities are related by the power flow equations
where
with θ h = θ − θ h and
We note that the function H is quadratic in the first argument, but linear in the second. Let (i, k) denote the line from bus i to bus k. When a line (i, k) fails, the admittance matrix changes to
We assume that the failure of one line does not cause catastrophic instability in the network, and that the state shifts from one quasi steady-state to another. As it does this, the voltage vector shifts from v to another vector v. Here we make a key assumption: customer loads and real power demands at generators do not change after the line failure. That is, we assume the complex power injection remains constant at each load bus, the real power injection and voltage magnitude remain constant at generator buses, and the complex voltage phasor remains constant at the slack bus. We believe this to be a reasonable assumption, as generally customers do not change their load in response to a network line failure (barring a power outage), and generators cannot quickly change their power output. We can also accommodate known nonzero changes to the specified parameters. While we do not know all ofv, we do know the voltage phasors rendered observable by the PMUs. Let m denote the number of observable voltage phasors, and let E ∈ {0, 1} m×n be a matrix that selects these phasors, i.e. the ith row ofẼ has a one in the position of the observed bus and zeros elsewhere. Let ∆v ≡v−v be the change in the vector of voltage phasors after line failure; thenẼ∆v denotes the known voltage phasor changes. This set of observable voltage phasor changes acts as a fingerprint for the change that occurred in the network. Even when we cannot directly observe the change, we can often identify it from the fingerprint.
The problem, therefore, is the following: given the network state prior to a line failure and the voltage fingerprintẼ∆v ∈ R m , determine which line failed. It is possible that two or more line failures have either the same or practically indistinguishable fingerprints. For example, one of two parallel lines with equal admittance may fail, or two lines that are distant from all PMUs but near each other may yield similar fingerprints. Often, even when a line failure is not observable, our method still produces valuable information. When multiple lines have the same effect on the network, our technique can be used to identify a small set of potential lines to inspect more closely.
III. DERIVATION As a brute force approach to identifying line failures, we could compute for each line (i, k) the voltage change ∆v ik that would result if (i, k) failed. We would then search all lines to find the (i, k) that minimizes Ẽ ∆v ik −Ẽ∆v . This algorithm is exact in the absence of measurement error, fingerprint collisions, or unknown changes in power supply or demand. However, it requires that we solve the nonlinear power flow equations once for each line in the network, and this is expensive. We now present an approximate version of this algorithm that retains high accuracy at much lower cost.
When a line (i, k) fails, the admittance matrix changes by ∆Y ik . The voltage and power injections then shift according to the equation
Now we find δv ik ≈ ∆v ik by linearizing in v only. The linearized equation is
This is equivalent to taking one step of Newton iteration on the power flow equations, starting from the old voltage vector as an initial guess. If bus is a generator bus, then δ|v | = 0, and Q is not of interest for our method, so we remove row and column n + from the system of equations. We may also remove the rows and columns associated with the slack bus, as its voltage does not change after failure. Thus, if there are G generator buses and L load buses, eliminating known quantities from (6) leads to the reduced linear system
where δv ik ∈ R 2L+G is the reduced version of δṽ ik , and similarly with J ik and r ik .
The term δs includes all the effects of changes to specified quantities such as real and reactive power at load buses or (via columns ofJ ik ) changes to voltage magnitudes at generator buses. Through the remainder of the paper, we assume these quantities are unchanged since the last full state estimate, i.e. δs = 0. In some cases, we might want to relax the assumption that the bus specifications do not change; for example, a line outage may cause some load buses in a distribution network to lose power, in which case their power injection becomes zero. Smart meters on homes could then report which homes have lost power. We leave this as future work.
Given δv ik as in (7), we use Eδv ik as an estimate for the changes in observed bus voltages were (i, k) to fail, where E here represents the reduced version ofẼ. This leads us to Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 solves one linear problem per line. Though the Jacobian J ik is different for each line, we can modify Algorithm 1 to compute δv ik at the cost of one linear solve per bus with the pre-failure Jacobian, along with a small amount of work per line. We now show how to accomplish this.
Algorithm 1 Hybrid algorithm for finding failed lines.
for each node i in the network do for each node k neighboring i do if t ik already computed then Continue. end if Compute Eδv ik via Equation (7). Set t ik = Eδv ik − E∆v . end for end for Select line (i, k) with minimum t ik . LetJ = ∂H(v, Y )/∂v denote the pre-failure Jacobian, and note that we may write eachJ ik as
The vector H(v; ∆Y ik ) has only four nonzero entries:
andP ki ,Q ki are defined similarly. Let
by the chain rule, we can write
More concretely, we have
Because H(v, ∆Y ik ) does not depend on any voltage phasors other than those at nodes i and j, we may writẽ
Therefore, we havẽ
Now, as in (7), we consider the reduced Jacobian
where U ik isŨ ik with inactive rows removed, and
We note that we can also write r ik = W ik p:
By the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula,
To evaluate (16), we precompute EJ −1 , which involves m rows of J −1 , as well as the matrices X ik , each of which involves sixteen elements of J −1 in the same sparsity pattern as seen inÃ ik . In evaluating X ik , we consider U ik , W ik , and V ik separately, as one can reuse rows of U T ik J −1 for other lines involving buses i or k. This leads us to Algorithm 2, in which precomputing these matrices is the only expensive step.
While Algorithm 2 is an improvement over refactoring J ik for each line, this approach still requires that we compute (though not store) all the elements of J −1 . We can avoid this costly step by noting that, if we know that the algorithm will never select a line incident to node i, then we never need to compute any elements of the rows of J −1 associated with node i (unless it is part of EJ −1 ). Therefore, if we can filter out lines that Algorithm 2 will definitely not select, then we do not need to compute as much of J −1 . In order to quickly filter out lines from consideration, we observe from (16) that Eδv ik belongs to the threedimensional linear space
Thus, the error t ik = Ev ik − Ev that appears in Algorithm 2 is bounded from below by
Thus, if t ik < τ i k for lines (i, k) and (i , k ), then we know that t ik < t i k , and we need not compute t i k at all. Computing τ ik for any line (i, k) is cheap; exploiting this fact leads to the FLiER method (Algorithm 3), which is significantly faster than Algorithm 3 1 .
A. M-FLiER: An extension to multiple line failures
The FLiER algorithm may be extended to identify multiple line failures. We consider multiple line failures to be sequential if the system returns to steady-state operation in between the failures; otherwise, the failures are simultaneous. To find sequential line failures, one may repeatedly use Algorithm 2; but if simultaneous failures occur, identifying the lines that failed is more challenging. One could check every pair or triple of lines that failed, using a simple modification to Algorithm 3. However, this may be too expensive.
When one line fails, we have the fingerprint Eδv ik = EJ −1 W ik ik . When multiple lines fail, we have
Algorithm 3 FLiER. Fast approximation algorithm for identifying line failure.
Compute and store EJ −1 . Compute τ ik for all lines (i, k) via Equation (18) . Order the lines ascending by their τ ik 's.
where L is the set of lines in the power network. This allows us to write the following linear program:
In this linear program, we use the ∞ norm on each ik so that it is free to place more weight within a given line after some weight has already been placed there. We then take an " 1 norm over lines" to encourage sparsity of line selection. The second term encourages the linear program to try to match the observed fingerprint.
In our experiments, ω value on the order of 10
tend to work well on the IEEE 57-bus test network. By thresholding, one may then select lines that the linear program suggests are of interest.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Our standard experimental setup is as follows. For each line (i, k) in the network, we perform a test in which we compute the system state before and after the failure of (i, k), i.e. with and without (i, k) included in the network model. We then pass to FLiER both the full pre-failure state and the subset of the post-failure state that would be observable by some set of PMUs.
We run most of our experiments with three PMU arrangements. In the first arrangement, we have a single PMU in the network, a near-worst-case scenario. In the second, we have a sparse PMU deployment, demonstrating what one might expect in a realistic scenario. Finally, we simulate PMUs everywhere, in which case any error is purely due to the linear approximation.
Note that the failure of lines (32, 33) and (35, 36) both cause the power flow solver to fail to converge, and so these tests are not included in the experiments.
A. Filter Effectiveness
The cost of FLiER depends strongly on the effectiveness of the filtering procedure. In Figures 1-2 , we show how often the filter saves us from performing the t ik computation in experiments on the IEEE 57-bus and 118-bus networks. Each figure shows three PMU deployments, as described above. For each PMU deployment, we show the cumulative distribution function of the fraction of lines for which t ik need not be computed computed for each line failure.
In our experiments, the filter is effective even for modest PMU deployments. Note that both the dotted green line, the "practical scenario," and the dashed blue line, the "complete coverage scenario," illustrate deployments in which the number of PMUs in proportional to the network size. We show a typical case in which the filter performs well in Figure 3 .
B. Accuracy
In Figures 4, 5, and 7 , we show the accuracy of FLiER on the IEEE 57-bus test network. In these plots, each Blue dots are the lower bounds τ ik , while red squares are true scores t ik . Columns are sorted by τ ik . In this case, t ik only needs to be computed for eight lines.
column represents the t ik values that were computed for one line failure scenario. The black dots represent the t ik 's of lines that get past the filter, while the green circle, yellow triangle, or red square represents t ik for the correct answer. If there is a green circle, then our algorithm correctly identified the actual line that failed. If there is a yellow triangle, the correct line was not chosen but was among the top three lines selected by the algorithm. Otherwise, there is a red square.
In Figure 4 , we show results from a test carried out with PMUs placed on every bus in the network. In this experiment, 77 of 78 failed lines were correctly identified. In the remaining test case, the failed line was among the three with top scores.
In the experiment shown in Figure 5 , PMUs were placed on buses 3, 12, and 33. Here, the effect of the error due to the linear approximation is increased by the low-rank projection E. In this case, 68 of 78 lines were correctly identified, a correct identification rate of 0.872. Even when the algorithm is incorrect, it gives the correct line one of the top 3 scores in every test. Furthermore, for all tests in which the algorithm mis-identified the failed line, the line that received that top score was incident to the correct line. That is, even when this algorithm is "wrong," it often selects a line near the line that actually failed. We show an example in Figure 6 .
In Figure 7 , we show an experiment in which there is 
C. Linear Programming Extension
To test the accuracy of the linear programming approach in Equation (20), we conducted an experiment in which we removed every pair of lines in the IEEE 57-bus network and tried to identify the removed lines through the linear program. Those pairs that cause the power flow solver to not converge were not included. We show the results in in each experiment, while the solid red line represents max(r 1 , r 2 ). The experiments are sorted by max(r 1 , r 2 ). The linear program tends to give sparse solutions, so many lines are given a weight of 0. If a correct line is given a weight of 0, we assume it is ordered last, even though typically many lines have weight 0.
In our experiments, this formulation often identifies one failed line, and sometimes identifies both. In addition, it performs well with PMUs everywhere, suggesting that most of the error in the other cases is due to the lowrank projection. However, we need many more PMUs to identify all failed lines with this approach than we needed to identify one failed line with Algorithm 3.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented FLiER, a fast, practical algorithm to identify single-line topology errors based on a sparse deployment of PMUs. Though we have focused on identifying a line failure, our approach can be used for more general topology errors as well. Our algorithm requires that one obtain a state estimate shortly before the topology changes, and assumes that the network specifications remain unchanged or change in a known way as a result of the failure. Our method can be used in both distribution and transmission networks, and is compatible with "zooming in" on network switches, as many current topology error correction techniques do.
We have also extended this algorithm to a linear programming formulation that can identify multiple simultaneous line failures. To obtain good results with this algorithm, we required more PMUs than we needed with the single-line algorithm. In our simulations, the linear programming approach typically identified at least one line that failed, and frequently was able to identify more.
There are several remaining questions open for future work. We believe it is important to analyze the sensitivity of our technique to noise in PMU readings and errors in the pre-failure state estimate. We also believe it is possible to diagnose when the linear approximation is most likely to lead to incorrect diagnosis, and perhaps to do more computation to deal with those cases. In addition, we plan to extend our approach to handling other system events, such as single-phase line failures or changes in line parameters due to overloading.
